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SURVEY ARTICLES

Business Associations

by Paul A. Quir6s*
Lynn S. Scott**
and
William B. Shearer III***
This Article surveys recent developments in Georgia's corporate,
securities, partnership and banking law. It covers noteworthy cases
decided during the survey period' by the Georgia appellate courts,
United States district courts located in Georgia, and the Eleventh Circuit
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Court of Appeals. Also included in this Article are highlights of recent
revisions to the Official Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.").
I.
A.

CORPORATIONS

Piercing the Corporate Veil

A corporation is a legal entity separate from its shareholders, officers
and agents. The corporation's owners and managers act as mere agents
of the corporation and are not personally liable for the corporation's
debts. However, this so-called corporate shield is not impenetrable; it
may be pierced. In determining whether to pierce the corporate veil, the
most fundamental analysis focuses on whether the corporate structure
has been so abused that injustice can only be avoided by holding the
agents of the corporation liable for its debts.2 More often than not,
Georgia courts did not pierce the corporate veil when presented with the
issue during this survey period. However, the courts pierced the
corporate veil under circumstances in which the corporation's officers or
directors paid for their own personal apartments with corporate funds,
commingled funds, and personally collected insurance proceeds for
damages specifically caused by the officer making the claim.3
Notwithstanding the continued proliferation of veil-piercing claims, the
Georgia courts have failed to provide concrete guidance for evaluating
disparate factual situations. The courts have continued to use a variety
of theories to justify piercing the corporate veil, including alter ego,
apparent or ostensible agency, fraud, abuse, and joint venturer.' As a
result, appellate review has been inconsistent, and potential appellants
are more apt to try their fortune at the appellate level.5
Courts generally frame the issue of piercing the corporate veil as
whether the corporation is the alter ego or business conduit of its
shareholders. 6 The main inquiry does not focus on the composition of

2. See generally JEROME L. KAPLAN ET AL., KAPLAN'S NADLER, GEORGIA CORPORATIONS,
LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES § 3-4 (1999).

3. See NLRB v. West Dixie Enters., Inc., 190 F.3d 1191 (11th Cir. 1999); Blitch Ford,
Inc. v. MIC Property & Cas. Ins. Group, No. 7:97-CV-21, 2000 WL 352353 (M.D. Ga., Mar.
31, 2000).
4. See, e.g., Kissun v. Humana, Inc., 267 Ga. 419, 419-21, 479 S.E.2d 751, 752-53
(1997).
5. See Paul A. Quir6s, Lynn S. Scott & George Ward Hendon, Jr., BusinessAssociations,
51 MERCER L. REV. 127, 128 (1999); Paul A. Quir6s & Gregory M. Beil, Business
Associations, 47 MERCER L. REV. 41, 42-48 (1995); Paul A. Quir6s & Lynn Scott Magruder,
Business Associations, 43 MERCER L. REV. 85, 86-94 (1991).
6. See generally Hickman v. Hyzer, 261 Ga. 38, 39, 401 S.E.2d 738, 739 (1991); Mark
Six Realty Assocs., Inc. v. Drake, 219 Ga. App. 57, 61, 463 S.E.2d 917, 921 (1995); J & J
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corporate ownership or control because, under Georgia law, a corporation
and its shareholders or officers are separate entities even if wholly
owned and controlled by a sole shareholder.7 To pierce the corporate
veil in Georgia, a plaintiff must show the following: (1) that the
shareholder's disregard of the corporate entity made the corporation a
mere instrumentality for the transaction of the shareholder's own affairs;
(2) that there is such unity of interest and ownership that the separate
personalities of the corporate form and the shareholder or officer cease
to exist; and (3) that to adhere to the doctrine of a separate corporate
entity would promote injustice or perpetrate fraud.8 More specifically,
before a veil-piercing claim is submitted to a jury, courts will require
substantive evidence demonstrating that the corporate arrangement
represented simply a sham used "to defeat justice, to perpetuate fraud,
or to evade statutory, contractual or tort responsibility."9
1. Court of Appeals of Georgia Affirms Grant of Summary
Judgment and Provides Review of Georgia Law. The controversy
in Clark v. Cauthen1° began in 1987 as a result of an automobile
accident. Carolyn Clark (formerly Carolyn Tibbs) brought suit against
Studebaker's of Savannah, Inc. ("Studebaker's"), seeking damages she
incurred in a head-on collision with Janice Carter, a patron of Studebaker's. Because the accident occurred within fifteen minutes after Carter
departed Studebaker's and because Carter was allegedly intoxicated at
the time of the collision, Clark sought to hold Studebaker's liable for
Carter's negligence." A jury returned a verdict in favor of Clark in the
amount of $250,000 and against Carter and Studebaker's jointly and

Materials, Inc. v. Conyers Seafood Co., 214 Ga. App. 63, 64, 446 S.E.2d 781, 782 (1994);
Derbyshire v. United Builders Supplies, Inc., 194 Ga. App. 840, 844, 392 S.E.2d 37, 40
(1990).
7. International Telecomms. Exch. Corp. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 892 F. Supp. 1520,
1551-52 (N.D. Ga. 1995) (citing United States v. Fidelity Capital Corp., 920 F.2d 827, 837
(11th Cir. 1991)).
8. See supra notes 6 and 7.
9. Hickman, 261 Ga. at 39, 401 S.E.2d at 740 (quoting KAPLAN, supra note 2); see also
J & J Materials, 214 Ga. App. at 65, 446 S.E.2d at 783; Derbyshire, 194 Ga. App. at 844,
392 S.E.2d at 40; Amason v. Whitehead, 186 Ga. App. 320, 321,367 S.E.2d 107, 108 (1988).
10. 239 Ga. App. 226, 520 S.E.2d 477 (1999).
11. Tibbs v. Studebaker's of Savannah, Inc., 184 Ga. App. 642, 642-43, 362 S.E.2d 377,
377-78 (1987); see also Sutter v. Hutchings, 254 Ga. 194, 327 S.E.2d 716 (1985); O.C.G.A.
§§ 3-3-1, -22 to -23, and 51-1-6 (1990 & Supp. 2000) (stating that commercial establishments providing alcohol to a person who is in a state of noticeable intoxication, knowing
that person will soon be driving a vehicle, may be liable for a third party's injuries caused
by the negligence of the intoxicated driver).
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severally. 2 The court of appeals affirmed the verdict and certiorari
was denied.13 Unable to collect on her judgment, Clark initiated suit
against Victor Cauthen, a former shareholder and owner of Studebaker's,
in an effort to pierce the corporate veil and collect against him personally. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Cauthen, and
Clark appealed. 4
The Court of Appeals of Georgia reiterated principles of corporate law
rooted in the nineteenth century: "[E]ach corporation is a separate
entity, distinct and apart from its stockholders, and insulation from
liability is an inherent purpose of incorporation." 5 Adhering to these
principles, Georgia courts are reluctant to disregard the corporate
structure and hold individual stockholders liable for any corporate debt.
In determining whether to pierce the corporate veil, Georgia courts have
long upheld the following: "Sole ownership of a corporation by one
person or another corporation is not a factor, and neither is the fact that
the sole owner uses and controls it to promote his ends. There must be
evidence of abuse of the corporate form." 6 This abuse is not determined by any rigid formula although certain abuses may be more
condemning than others.
The record showed that "Cauthen sold his interest in Studebaker's to
a corporation that had been administratively dissolved, received a
$20,000 loan from Studebaker's that was later characterized as salary,
and forgave royalty payments that were to be paid [to] him." 7
However, the acts were justified, and none of these facts resulted in, or
resulted from, a disregard for the legal entity. The court found that
Cauthen was not aware of the administrative dissolution, that the
$20,000 loan "was consistent with Studebaker's usual practice regarding
the owner's compensation," and that forgiveness of
the royalty payments
18
"did not affect Studebaker's financial condition."'
While Clark amassed a record ripe with "questionable behavior,
inaccurate information and inconsistent testimony," she produced no
evidence "of triable jury issues which would result in the corporate veil
being pierced." 9 In veil-piercing claims, summary judgment is only
appropriate "if no evidence exists that shows, or from which it might be

12.
(1990).
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Studebaker's of Savannah, Inc. v. Tibbs, 195 Ga. App. 142, 142, 392 S.E.2d 908, 909
Id. at 142, 392 S.E.2d at 908.
239 Ga. App. at 226, 520 S.E.2d at 479.
Id. at 227, 520 S.E.2d at 479 (citations omitted).
Id. (citing Fuda v. Kroen, 204 Ga. App. 836, 837, 420 S.E.2d 767, 768 (1992)).
Id. at 226, 520 S.E.2d at 479.
Id. at 228, 520 S.E.2d at 480.
Id. at 228-29, 250 S.E.2d at 480.
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inferred, that 'the corporate arrangement was a sham, used to defeat
justice, to perpetuate fraud, or to evade statutory, contractual or tort
responsibility."' 2 ° As a result, the court of appeals found no error and
affirmed the superior court's grant of summary judgment.21
2. Application of the National Labor Relations Act Obligated
the Eleventh Circuit to Apply Federal Law in Lieu of State Law
Regarding Piercing the Corporate Veil. In National Labor
Relations Board v. West Dixie Enterprises, Inc.,22 the International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers filed a charge of unfair labor practices
against West Dixie Enterprises, Inc. ("West Dixie"), which prompted the
National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") to conduct an investigation of
the matter. Following its investigation, the NLRB filed a complaint
against West Dixie based on violations of sections 8(1) and 8(3) of the
National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"). 23 The NLRB subsequently
added West Dixie's owner, sole shareholder and president, Carole
Paolicelli, and her husband, Paul Paolicelli, West Dixie's director of
operations, as defendants because the NLRB believed that "the
egos of West Dixie and were therefore also liable
Paolicellis were alter
24
violations."
the
for
Congress intended for the scope of the NLRB's statutory jurisdiction
to be broad. "In passing the [NLRA], Congress intended to and did vest
in the [NLRB] the fullest jurisdictional breadth constitutionally
permissible under the Commerce Clause." 25 As a practical matter, it
is easiest to determine whether jurisdiction is present under the NLRA
by using the following test: "[J]urisdiction exists when gross interstate
inflow (purchases) or outflow (sales), whether direct or indirect, exceeds
$50,000.00 [in a one-year period]."26 West Dixie did not contest that it
made purchases in excess of $50,000 during 1994 and that the alleged
violations took place in 1994. Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the NLRB appropriately exercised its jurisdiction over
West Dixie and the Paolicellis, but from a purely corporate perspective,
the intriguing aspect of this case rests in the NLRB's application of the
NLRA to pierce the corporate veil. 27

20.
S.E.2d
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at 228, 520 S.E.2d at 480 (quoting J & J Materials, 214 Ga. App. at 65, 446
at 783).
Id. at 229, 520 S.E.2d at 481.
190 F.3d 1191 (11th Cir. 1999).
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (3) (1994).
190 F.3d at 1193.
Id. (quoting NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224, 226 (1963)).
Id. (quoting NLRB v. Jerry Durham Drywall, 974 F.2d 1000, 1002 (8th Cir. 1992)).

Id.
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The Paolicellis argued that under applicable state law veil-piercing
theories, they would not be personally liable for the NLRA violations.28
However, the NLRB refused to apply state law and instead applied "the
Tenth Circuit's two-pronged test for determining whether owners or
operators of a corporation are personally liable for the unfair labor
practices of the corporation."29 Under the Tenth Circuit's test:
the corporate veil may be pierced when: (1) there is such unity of
interest, and lack of respect given to the separate identity of the
corporation by its shareholders, that the personalities and assets of the
corporation and the individuals are indistinct, and (2)adherence to the
corporate form would sanction a fraud, promote injustice, or lead to an
evasion of legal obligations.3"
The first prong required the NLRB to consider "(a) the degree to which
the corporate legal formalities [had] been maintained, and (b) the degree
to which individual and corporate funds, other assets, and affairs [had]
been commingled."31 According to the record, "[t]he Paolicellis often
used personal checks or credit cards to pay for West Dixie's supplies and
payroll ...

[and] produced no records indicating that any of [the]

payments were bona fide loans or repayments, or that the individual and
corporate entities were kept separate." 32 While a failure to maintain
adequate records may have justified piercing the corporate veil alone,
the discovery of commingled funds provided an even stronger case.33
Moreover, the second prong provided a strong policy-based argument
that to find the Paolicellis not personally liable "would sanction a fraud,
promote injustice, or lead to an evasion of legal obligations."3 4 The
Paolicellis "[paid] rent on Mr. Paolicelli's personal apartment for six
months,... [and they] continued to operate their electrical contracting

business under the name West Dixie after the corporation was administratively dissolved."3 The diversion of corporate funds and the failure
to maintain corporate formalities and separate identities directly
resulted in West Dixie's inability to "meet its remedial obligations" under
the NLRA.3 6 As a result, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals found

28. Id. at 1194. The Paolicellis argued that Florida Statute § 607.1421(4) was
applicable. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. (quoting White Oak Coal Co., 318 N.L.R.B. 732, 735, 1995 WL 526356 (1995)).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1194-95.
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no error and affirmed the NLRB's holding that the Paolicellis were
personally liable. 7
Any time the NLRA is pleaded and applies, the Federal Court's
exclusive jurisdiction will make it possible for a plaintiff to have the
benefit of the Tenth Circuit's test, as adopted by the Eleventh Circuit,
to pierce the corporate veil.
3. A Corporation with a Single Stockholder and Insufficient
Funds, Without More, Does Not Create a Jury Question. In Wynn
v. Arias,3M Ethel Wynn and Arias Properties, Inc. ("API") entered into
a contract for the construction of Wynn's home. When the agreement fell
apart, Wynn demanded the return of her earnest money, but API argued
that Wynn had prevented the completion of the project and, therefore,
she was not entitled to the return of the earnest money. After API sold
the house to a third party, Wynn sued for breach of contract and
additional tort claims. Wynn claimed that the corporation was a sham
and that Arias, as API's president, should be personally liable because
(1) API's office and phone were in Arias' home and (2) Arias controlled39
API. Additionally, API had no funds to repay the earnest money.
The court stated:
[T]he mere operation of a corporation does not render one personally
liable for corporate acts. Sole ownership of a corporation by one
person, is not a factor and neither is the fact that the sole owner uses
and controls it to promote his ends. There must be evidence of
abuse.4"
The Court of Appeals of Georgia upheld the trial court's grant of
summary judgment because Wynn had presented no evidence of a sham,
fraud or inappropriate handling of corporate funds.4 Furthermore, the
court noted that the mere fact the corporation had little cash on hand
was not dispositive of the fraud issue.4 2 To be considered a sham, the
low cash balance must be coupled with intent to avoid future debts of
the corporation.43

37. Id. at 1195.
38. 242 Ga. App. 712, 531 S.E.2d 126 (2000).
39. Id. at 718-20, 531 S.E.2d at 132-34.

40. Id. at 719, 531 S.E.2d at 133.
41. Id. at 719-20, 531 S.E.2d at 133-34.
42. Id. at 719, 531 S.E.2d at 133.
43. Id.
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4. United States District Court for the Middle District of
Georgia Permits Joinder and Amendment of Counterclaim Based
on Veil-Piercing Theory. In Blitch Ford, Inc. v. MIC Property &
Casualty Insurance Corp.," Brett Blitch, on behalf of Blitch Ford, filed
an insurance claim with MIC Property and Casualty Insurance
Corporation ("MIC") to cover more than $450,000 of damages that
resulted from a fire at the Blitch Ford car dealership. MIC paid on all
the claims. After payment of the claims, Brett Blitch was convicted of
arson, and MIC sought to amend its answer to assert counterclaims
based on misrepresentation and fraud against both shareholders,
Margaret and Brett Blitch.4 5 The court held the claim against Margaret Blitch for misrepresentation "would be futile and insufficient as a
matter of law."46 However, the court held the corporate veil could be
pierced to find Brett Blitch personally liable.4 7 As identified in the
record, Brett Blitch not only "co-mingled funds for his personal benefit,"
but more importantly,
he used the corporation "to perpetuate fraud
4
against defendant."
5. Absent Fraud, One Who Deals with a Corporation as a
Corporate Entity Cannot Deny the Corporate Form and Hold the
Owner Liable. In Garrett v. Women's Health Care of Gwinnett,49 Dr.
Garrett sued Dr. Salvino and Women's Healthcare of Gwinnett, P.C.
("WHCG") for breach of her employment agreement. Dr. Garrett
attempted to pierce the corporate veil of WHCG and hold Dr. Salvino
individually liable for the alleged breach of her employment agreement.
Among its numerous holdings, the trial court granted summary
judgment in favor of Dr. Salvino on all individual claims against her.
On appeal, Dr. Garrett argued that the trial court erred by dismissing
Dr. Salvino as a defendant in her individual capacity and that the
corporate veil should be pierced to hold Dr. Salvino personally liable for
the actions of WHCG. 50
Dr. Garrett's employment agreement provided that if she did not
become a co-owner of WHCG after her first year of employment, WHCG
would pay her a production bonus after the end of her second year. Dr.
Garrett did not become a co-owner, left WHCG after two years, and was

44. No. 7:97-CV-21, 2000 WL 352353 (M.D. Ga., Mar. 31, 2000).
45. Id. at *1-2.
46. Id. at *2.

47.
48.
49.
50.

Id.
Id.
243 Ga. App. 53, 532 S.E.2d 164 (2000).
Id. at 55, 532 S.E.2d at 168.
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therefore entitled to the production bonus. The employment agreement
clearly stated the production bonus was to equal twenty-five percent of
the gross profits directly attributable to Dr. Garrett's work minus
$300,000, but the agreement was unclear as to calculation of gross
profits.5 1 When WHCG's corporate accountant asked if the term gross
profits was to include a deduction for costs, Dr. Salvino answered that
"that was her intent."52 The difference was substantial. Dr. Garrett's
bonus as calculated with a deduction for costs equaled $6,504.27 versus
a bonus without a deduction for costs equal to $50,973.07. Although the
trial court agreed that Dr. Garrett's bonus should have equaled the
latter, the trial court also found that Dr. Salvino could not be held liable
in a personal capacity and granted summary judgment in favor of Dr.
Salvino.53
In affuming the trial court's decision, the court of appeals held that
lolne who deals with a corporation as such an entity cannot, in the
absence of fraud, deny the legality of the corporate existence for the
purpose of holding the owner liable."54 The court of appeals reiterated
that piercing the corporate veil will not be justified absent fraud or
injustices or absent abuse of the corporate form.55 Noting that the
"record [was] devoid of evidence that would warrant piercing the
corporate veil," the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's holding.5"
B. Statutorily Created CorporationCannot Utilize Its Subsidiary to
Circumvent Statutory Restrictions
In Flint Electric Membership Corp. v. Barrow," the Georgia Supreme
Court addressed whether a rural electric membership corporation could
sell propane gas in violation of O.C.G.A. sections 46-3-170 to -541.",
Flint Electric Membership Corporation ("Flint") was incorporated under
the Georgia Electric Membership Corporation Act ("GEMCA") and had
a wholly owned subsidiary, FlintErgy, Inc. ("FlintErgy"). Unlike Flint,
FlintErgy was not incorporated under the GEMCA and therefore was
not, by statute, restricted from selling forms of energy other than
electrical energy.5 9 Thus, Flint and its board of directors intended to

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 53, 532 S.E.2d at 166.
Id. at 53-54, 532 S.E.2d at 166-67.
Id. at 55-56, 532 S.E.2d at 168.
Id. at 55, 532 S.E.2d at 168.
Id. at 56, 532 S.E.2d at 168.
Id.
271 Ga. 636, 523 S.E.2d 10 (1999).
See O.C.G.A. § 46-3-200 (1992).
271 Ga. at 637, 523 S.E.2d at 12.
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sell propane gas "either directly, or indirectly, through FlintErgy." ° At
trial the court held that "the GEMCA does not authorize an electric
membership corporation to sell or distribute propane gas."6 Moreover,
because "FlintErgy was the alter ego of Flint, the trial court also
enjoined Flint from selling propane gas indirectly through FlintErgy."6 2
On appeal, Flint argued that because the O.C.G.A. encouraged electric
membership corporations to assist, promote and develop other "methods
of conserving, producing, converting, and delivering energy," Flint could
sell propane gas through its subsidiary.63 The Georgia Supreme Court
disagreed with Flint and affirmed the trial court's decision.6 4 Using
traditional veil-piercing language, the Georgia Supreme Court noted:
"Whether a subsidiary company is the alter ego of a parent company and
whether the subsidiary company was formed to promote injustice or
protect fraud are generally questions for the trier of fact."" Holding
the trial court's findings were supported by the evidence, the Georgia
Supreme Court concluded that "Flint created FlintErgy as a shell and
solely for its own convenience and benefit"; thus, "Flint cannot engage
in the sale of propane gas indirectly through FlintErgy."66
C. Even without a Certificate of Authority, a Foreign Corporation's
Claim Is Not Void
In the only other true corporate case to reach the Supreme Court of
Georgia during the survey period, the Supreme Court of Georgia granted
certiorari in Transportation Insurance Co. v. El Chico Restaurants,
Inc.67 to interpret O.C.G.A. section 14-2-1502(a).6 s The sole issue on
appeal to the supreme court concerned whether the phrase "maintain a
proceeding" under the statutory language included the commencement
of that action, so that the failure of a foreign corporation to obtain a
certificate of authority prior to the commencement of the action would
render it void ab initio.69 The supreme court held that "[b]ased on the

60.
61.
62.
63.

Id., 523 S.E.2d at 11.
Id., 523 S.E.2d at 12.
Id.
Id.

64.
65.
66.
67.

Id.
Id. at 638, 523 S.E.2d at 12 (citations and internal quotations omitted).
Id., 523 S.E.2d at 12-13.
271 Ga. 774, 524 S.E.2d 486 (1999).

68. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1502 (1994) (titled "Consequences of transacting business without
authority").
69. 271 Ga. at 775, 524 S.E.2d at 487. Void ab initio is translated as follows: "Null

from the beginning, as from the moment when a contract is entered into." BLAcK's LAW
DICTIONARY 1568 (7th ed. 1999).
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language of O.C.G.A. section 14-2-1502(a) and its legislative history,...
a foreign corporation's action is not void for failure to obtain a certificate
of authority [either before or after commencement] and thus the court of
appeals correctly held that El Chico's action could be amended."7"
O.C.G.A. section 14-2-1502(a) provides that "[a] foreign corporation
transacting business in this state without a certificate of authority may
not maintain a proceeding in any court in this state until it obtains a
certificate of authority."7
In her opinion, Justice Hunstein utilized
classic statutory interpretation analyses. Referring to Black's Law
Dictionary, the American Heritage Dictionary, Webster's Third New
International Dictionary, and Ballentine's Law Dictionary, the majority
held that (1) the word "maintain" does not include the "commencement
of the item to be maintained"; (2) most commonly "maintain" means "the
continuation of a pre-existing condition"; and (3) "to 'maintain an action'
72
most commonly means the continuation of a lawsuit already begun."
The majority also reviewed legislative history and found the 1969
legislature included the phrase "unless before commencement of the
action it shall have obtained such a certificate" in a previous version of
the statute, but the 1988 legislature removed any reference to the word
"commencement."73 Therefore, the Georgia Supreme Court concluded
that because the legislature removed the 1969 language, which had
required foreign corporations to obtain a certificate of authority "before
commencement of the action," El Chico could obtain its certificate of
authority and amend its claim.74
In any event, it is clear that in order to maintain a claim (which
includes the time period after commencement), a foreign corporation will
need to obtain a certificate at some time during the litigation.
D.

Inspection of CorporateDocuments Denied

Two cases appeared before the Court of Appeals of Georgia that
reaffirmed which corporate documents members or shareholders could
demand to inspect and under which circumstances they could do so. In
Parker v. Clary Lakes Recreation Ass'n,75 the Cobb County Superior
Court denied Parker's application to compel Clary Lakes Recreation
Association, Inc. ("CLRA") to produce corporate documents. Parker
originally sued CLRA, his neighborhood's homeowner's association, in

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

271 Ga. at 775, 524 S.E.2d at 487.
O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1502(a).
271 Ga. at 775, 524 S.E.2d at 487.
Id. at 775-76, 524 S.E.2d at 487-88.
Id. at 777, 524 S.E.2d at 488.
243 Ga. App. 681, 534 S.E.2d 154 (2000).

106
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1997.76 After discovery was closed, Parker requested to "'inspect all
accounting and/or corporate records of [CLRA] for the purpose of
determining the performance of management and the condition of the
corporation.' 7 v CLRA refused Parker's request for the additional
documents, and Parker sought an order to compel production. After
deciding that Parker's primary motive behind the request was to
continue discovery beyond the applicable period, the trial court ordered
CLRA to produce only one of nine categories that Parker requested.78
Under Georgia law, two categories of corporate records may be
inspected.7 9 The first category, which consists of basic corporate
structuring documents and includes by-laws, minutes, resolutions and
the articles of incorporation, is described in O.C.G.A. section 14-21602(a). The second category, which consists of more specific requests
and includes accounting records and other minutes or records that are
not covered under O.C.G.A. section 14-2-1602(a), is described in O.C.G.A.
section 14-2-1602(c). Any shareholder may inspect and copy documents
in the first category upon giving written notice to the company and
waiting five business days before inspection.8 ° However, a shareholder
may inspect documents in the second category only if:
(1) His demand is made in good faith and for a proper purpose that is
reasonably relevant to his legitimate interest as a shareholder;
(2) He describes with reasonable particularity his purpose and the
records he desires to inspect;
(3) The records are directly connected with his purpose; and
(4) The records are to be used only for the stated purpose.8'
If a shareholder satisfies the requirements in O.C.G.A. section 14-21602, and a corporation does not permit inspection or copying, the
shareholder "may apply to the superior court for an order permitting
inspection and copying of the requested records." 2 And, "'unless the
corporation proves that it refused inspection in good faith because it had
a reasonable basis for doubt about the right of the [shareholder] to
inspect the records demanded,"' the corporation will be liable for costs
and attorney fees.83

76. Id. at 681, 534 S.E.2d at 155.
77. Id. at 682, 534 S.E.2d at 155.
78. Id. The judge ordered CLRA to produce "any minutes as required by O.C.G.A. § 143-1602(a)(5)." Id. at 684, 534 S.E.2d at 156.
79. See O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1602 (1994).
80. Id. § 14-2-1602(b).
81. Id. § 14-2-1602(d).
82. Parker, 243 Ga. App. at 683, 534 S.E.2d at 156.
83. Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 14-3-1604(c)).

2000]

BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS

Because Parker requested documents that mainly fell into the second
category, the trial court had to determine whether Parker had requested
the documents for a "proper purpose." 4 The burden of proof was on
Parker, and he did not sufficiently demonstrate that his request was
anything other than "'an attempt to obtain discovery for [his lawsuit
against CLRA] after the expiration of the discovery period.' 8 5 Without
proof that this request was for a proper purpose, the superior court also
refused to impose costs and attorney fees. 6 In its holding, the court of
appeals specifically noted that (1) the trial judge was "in the best
position to evaluate Parker's motives for seeking the documents" and (2)
the trial judge's findings were not clearly erroneous.8 7 Therefore, the
court of appeals affirmed the Cobb County Superior Court's holding. 8
Similarly, in JarAllah v. American Culinary Federation, Inc.,s9
JarAllah sought to inspect and copy records of American Culinary
Federation, Inc. ("ACF") pursuant to an alleged refusal by ACF to
produce the requested documents.9" However, the Court of Appeals of
Georgia held that "ACF never refused to permit JarAllah to inspect its
records" and that in reality "ACF did not respond, due to 'simple
oversight."'' s Accordingly, ACF never "refused inspection" and could
not be liable for costs or attorney fees under O.C.G.A. section 14-21604.92
E.

Defective Service of Process on Non-Resident Corporation

In Teledata World Services, Inc. v. Tele-Mart, Inc.,9' Tele-Mart, Inc.
("Tele-Mart"), a Nevada corporation, was authorized to transact business
in the state of Georgia. Teledata World Services, Inc. ("Teledata")
attempted to serve process on Tele-Mart for breach of contract.94 After
attempting to serve process on Tele-Mart at its Atlanta and New York
City registered addresses, Teledata "argue[d] that it then perfected
service under the Georgia Long Arm Statute" by personally serving a

84. Id. The judge did however order that "any minutes as required by O.C.G.A. § 14-2-

1602(a)(5)" be produced. Id.
85. Id. at 684, 534 S.E.2d at 156.
86. Id.
87. Id. The trial judge was also the presiding judge in Parker's original 1997 suit
against CLRA. Id. at 684, 534 S.E.2d at 157.

88. Id.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

242 Ga. App. 595, 529 S.E.2d 919 (2000).
Id. at 595, 529 S.E.2d at 920.
Id. at 596, 529 S.E.2d at 920.
Id., 529 S.E.2d at 921.
242 Ga. App. 842, 531 S.E.2d 372 (2000).
Id. at 842, 531 S.E.2d at 372.
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Teledata employee in New York.95 The trial court granted Tele-Mart's
motion to dismiss for insufficiency of service of process, and the Court of
Appeals of Georgia affirmed.96
In a succinct statement of law the court held:
Georgia's Long Arm Statute may be used to serve nonresident
defendants. To be considered a 'nonresident' under the Long Arm
Statute, a corporation must neither be a Georgia corporation nor a
foreign corporation authorized to do or transact business in Georgia.
Because Tele-Mart is authorized to transact business in Georgia, the
Long Arm Statute is not applicable here.97
F

Direct Versus Derivative Suit
In Matthews v. Tele-Systems, Inc.," Tele-Systems was a closely-held
corporation. Originally, Tele-Systems had four director/shareholders.
Charles Matthews was one of the director/shareholders and owned
approximately one-third of Tele-Systems' stock. After the other three
directors convinced him that one of Tele-Systems' largest, most
substantial clients did not want Matthews on the board of directors,
Matthews resigned as a board member. After Matthews' resignation, he
voted his shares to re-elect the three remaining board members. Once
the three were in control of the board, Tele-Systems issued enough new
stock so that Matthews would own less than one-quarter of the
outstanding stock. Tele-Systems then fired Matthews and executed a
reverse stock split. An effect, and presumably the intent, of the reverse
stock split was to force Matthews' holdings in Tele-Systems to revert to
a simple claim for cash. Matthews then filed suit against Tele-Systems
and its remaining three director/shareholders for breach of fiduciary
duty. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of TeleSystems on all counts of the breach of fiduciary duty claim, and
Matthews appealed.9 9 The Court of Appeals of Georgia affirmed the
trial court's grant of summary judgment. °°
Regarding Matthews' claim for breach of fiduciary duty based on the
grant and payment of excessive salaries, the court held the following:
(1) "[A] shareholder seeking to recover misappropriated corporate funds
may only bring a derivative suit"; (2) Matthews "acquiesced in and
ratified the salaries" and, therefore, was "estopped from complaining";

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id.
Id. at 843, 529 S.E.2d at 373.
Id. at 842, 529 S.E.2d at 373.
240 Ga. App. 871, 525 S.E.2d 413 (1999).
Id. at 871-72, 525 S.E.2d at 414.
Id. at 872, 525 S.E.2d at 414.
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and (3) "Matthews' exclusive remedy for matters affecting the price of
his 'stock" rested in the stock appraisal action that was currently
pending and brought by Tele-Systems in the DeKalb Superior Court. °1
The claim that the director/shareholders had been paid an excessive
salary was, essentially, a claim for waste of corporate assets. Because
Matthews initiated a direct action instead of a derivative action and
because Matthews could not prove that he sustained any special injuries
separate and distinct from those suffered by any other shareholders of
the corporation, his action failed. 0 2
In the second count, Matthews alleged the other director/shareholders
deceived him by forcing him to resign from the board of directors and,
as a result, he suffered his injury and loss.' °3 The court of appeals
held that because Matthews owned less than one-third of the shares at
the time he resigned from the board, the other owners, who as a group
held more than two-thirds of the outstanding stock, "had the right and
power to vote Matthews out of office." 0 4 The court likened Matthews'
situation to that of an employer that deceives an at-will employee to
induce resignation: "[Tihe employer could have fired the employee at
will at any time, the choosing of more palatable yet deceitful means does
not harm the employee in the end analysis."10 5
G.

Legislative Changes

The 1999 session of the General Assembly of Georgia passed several
amendments to the Business Code,' 6 the most notable of which are
summarized below.
1.
Rights Plans-Deviation From Delaware. O.C.G.A. section 14-2-624 substantially revises the Georgia Business Corporation
Code ("GBCC") with regard to rights plans. Over the past several years,
Georgia case law has begun to deviate from Delaware case law with
regard to certain provisions in rights plans. Rights plans (1) are
designed to preserve control by the target board during the process
relating to potential takeover transactions and (2) operate to make it
prohibitively expensive for an acquiror to acquire enough shares to
exceed a specified threshold without the approval of the target board.

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 872-74, 525 S.E.2d at 414-15.
Id. at 872-73, 525 S.E.2d at 415.
Id. at 874, 525 S.E.2d at 415.
Id., 525 S.E.2d at 415-16.
Id., 525 S.E.2d at 416.
O.C.G.A. §§ 14-2-101 to -1703 (1994 & Supp. 2000).
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°
the United
In Invacare Corp. v. Healthdyne Technologies, Inc.,
a dead
upheld
of
Georgia
District
Northern
for
the
Court
States District
Essentially,
plan.'
rights
Invacare's
hand provision that was part of
the dead hand provision operates to protect against proxy contests by
allowing an incumbent board that is actually voted out to retain control
over the rights plan or poison pill. Several Delaware cases have rejected
the dead hand provision. " 9 In the 1999 session, the GBCC was
revised to codify the holding in Invacare Corp. and permit dead hand
provisions-subject to certain limitations. The language as revised in
O.C.G.A. section 14-2-624 reads as follows:

(d) The terms and conditions of rights, options, or warrants issuable
pursuant to this Code section may include provisions that:
(1) Preclude or limit the exercise, transfer, or receipt of such rights,
options, or warrants by, or invalidate or void any such rights, options,
or warrants held by, any person that is a beneficial owner of a specified
amount of the outstanding equity securities or percentage of the
outstanding voting power of the corporation, or by any transferee of
such person, except that such provisions shall not affect any person
whose beneficial ownership at the date of adoption of any such
provision exceeds such specified amount or percentage, unless the
amount of outstanding equity securities beneficially owned by such
person is subsequently increased; and
(2) Limit, restrict, or condition the power of a future director to vote
for the redemption, modification, or termination of the rights, options,
or warrants for a period not to exceed 180 days from the initial election
of the director; provided that, such 180 day time limitation shall not
apply to any such limitation, restriction, or condition that is based
solely on a director's current or former status as an employee or officer
of the corporation; as a director, officer, employee, affiliate, or associate
of any interested shareholder or person seeking to become an interested shareholder; or as a director, officer, or employee of an affiliate of
an interested shareholder or person seeking to become an interested
shareholder."O
Essentially, new directors will be prohibited from withdrawing or
changing a rights plan for a maximum of 180 days; provided, however,
the prohibition may continue beyond 180 days if the prohibition is based
solely on certain current or former positions or relationships by the
director with (1) the target, (2) an interested shareholder or person

107. 968 F. Supp. 1578 (N.D. Ga. 1997).
108. Id. at 1578.
109. See Carmody v. Toll Bros., 723 A.2d 1180 (Del. Ch. 1998); Quickturn Design Sys.,
Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281 (Del. 1998).
110. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-624(d).
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seeking to become an interested shareholder, or (3) an affiliate of an
interested shareholder or person seeking to become an interested
shareholder."' Additionally, the revisions significantly expanded the
types of items that may be included in a shareholder agreement and,
specifically, allow shareholder agreements to eliminate the board of
directors or restrict its powers under certain circumstances." 2
2. Revisions to Statutory Governance of Architects. Act
901"' comprehensively revised the law relating to the practice of
architecture and created the Georgia State Board of Architects and
Interior Designers as a successor to the State Board of Architects. The
Act increased board membership to include two qualified interior
designers, and created the position of vice president. It redefined the
practice of architecture and changed qualifications of registered
architects, restrictions on their practice, and registration renewals. The
Act defined what structures need the seal of an architect and provided
for exceptions, enforcement, and penalties. The Act also amended
O.C.G.A. section 43-14-2, relating the State Construction Industry
Licensing Board, to redefine "utility system" to include leachate
collection and treatment systems associated with landfills. The Act also
amended O.C.G.A. ch. 43-39A, relating to Georgia Real Estate Appraisers Board ("the Board"), and O.C.G.A. ch. 43-40, relating to real estate
brokers and sales persons, to require certain applicants and persons
under investigation by the Board to submit fingerprints and to authorize
the Board to obtain records of criminal convictions of applicants and
certain licensees.
II.
A.

SECURITIES

Sturm v. Marriott Marquis Part II

On February 7, 2000, the United States District Court in the Northern
District of Georgia decided round two of Sturm v.Marriott Marquis
Corp.14 On November 16, 1998, the district court granted Marriott
Marquis' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim as to the federal
claims because Sturm had failed to meet the heightened standard for
pleading scienter under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
("PSLRA").' 5 Thereafter, Sturm amended his complaint and Marriott

111. Id. § 14-2-624(d)(2).
112. Id. §§ 14-2-731 and -732.
113. 2000 Ga. Laws 1527.
114. 85 F. Supp. 2d 1356 (N.D. Ga. 2000).
115. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b).
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Marquis moved to dismiss his amended complaint.116 In a wellstructured and lengthy opinion, District Judge Thrash again granted the
motion to dismiss in part and denied the motion to dismiss in part.'17
In the first count, the court addressed Sturm's claims that Marriott
Marquis had committed securities fraud under Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934118 and Rule 10(b)-5119 promulgated
thereunder. 2 '
Sturm claimed that Marriott Marquis made false
statements and concealed material facts during the proposed restructuring of the limited partnership. 121 To succeed with his claim under
Rule 10(b)-5, Sturm had to allege with specificity that "the [Marriott
Marquis] (1) made a misstatement or omission, (2) of material fact, (3)
with scienter, (4) in connection with the purchase or sale of securities,
(5) upon which [Sturm] relied, and (6) that reliance approximately
caused [Sturm's] injury." ' On the other hand, Marriott Marquis
argued it could not be sued for securities fraud at the same time it was
accused of mismanagement. 2 ' Disagreeing with Marriott Marquis'
argument, the court held that "[a]llegations of mismanagement and
breach of fiduciary duty do not, however, bar a claim for securities fraud
' 124
if the elements of such a claim are adequately pleaded.'
Regarding Sturm's argument that Marriott Marquis failed to disclose
the consideration connected with the contemplated real estate investment trust ("REIT") conversion when the merger was being considered
by and offered to the partnership, the court held Sturm adequately
pleaded with particularity that Marriott Marquis had provided
misleading information. 1 25 However, because Sturm had not alleged
Marriott Marquis took any action beyond a preliminary internal
consideration of the REIT conversion, the omission did not rise to the
level of materiality required to state a claim for securities fraud. 26
Next, the court addressed Sturm's argument that the limited partners
should have been issued a short term bridge loan instead of losing their
equity position, holding the "central thrust" of its argument rested on

116. 85 F. Supp. at 1360.
117. Id.
118. 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (Supp. IV 1998).
119. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10(b)-5 (2000).
120. 85 F. Supp. 2d at 1364.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1365 (citing Robbins v. Koger Properties, Inc., 116 F.3d 1441, 1447 (11th
Cir. 1997)).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1370.
126. Id.
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corporate mismanagement and "such claims are not cognizable under
Additionally, the court held Sturm's
federal securities laws."' 27
had understated the appraisal value by
Marquis
that
Marriott
argument
material because "the hypothetical
was
not
$20
million
roughly
reasonable investor would understand that the value he or she received
from the REIT conversion depended upon a number of variables, only
one of which was the appraised value of the Hotel."' 28
Sturm also failed to prove Marriott Marquis possessed a mental state
29
that embraced an "intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud."
Although Sturm provided numerous facts establishing the limited
partnership merger had benefited Marriott Marquis to the detriment of
plaintiffs, those facts alone were not enough to establish scienter.
Sturm, however, presented more persuasive evidence alleging Marriott
Marquis had identified two lenders willing to refinance the hotel
Therefore, Marriott Marquis affirmatively lied about
mortgage.
130
While
availability during its solicitation for approval of the merger.
the facts alleged by Sturm had yet to be proven, the court held scienter
Section 10(b) claims to proceed
was adequately pleaded to allow Sturm's
31
as to the alleged misrepresentation.'
B. Shares of Closely-Held CorporationHeld to Be "Securities"Under
the Georgia Securities Act
In Bell v.Sasser,"2 Robert Sasser and his son John Sasser founded
and owned one hundred precent of Sundance Boats, Inc. ("Sundance").
After only a few months of operation, the Sassers were approached by
Seaborne Bell, who wanted to acquire their company. After some
negotiation, the parties drafted an agreement pursuant to which Bell
purchased the outstanding shares of Sundance for $200,000. After the
sale, Robert Sasser went to work for a boat manufacturing company he
had worked with prior to founding Sundance. Several years later, and
apparently because Sundance did not turn a profit, Bell and Sundance
filed suit against Robert Sasser, John Sasser, and Robert Sasser's
employer, Carolina Skiff, Inc. ("Carolina Skiff'). Both parties filed crossmotions for partial summary judgment, and the trial court granted

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id.
Id. at 1370-71.
Id. at 1371 (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976)).
Id. at 1372.
Id.
238 Ga. App. 843, 520 S.E.2d 287 (1999).
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summary
judgment in favor of Robert Sasser, John Sasser, and Carolina
1 33
Skiff.
Two separate cases were at issue in the appeal. In the first case, Bell
and Sundance appealed the entry of summary judgment against them
regarding whether the Sassers sold Bell unregistered securities in
violation of Georgia law.1 34
In the second case, the Sassers and
Carolina Skiff appealed the trial court's failure to grant summary
judgment in their favor regarding the allegation that Robert Sasser
fraudulently misrepresented to Bell that he would personally take care
of any warranty work required on Sundance boats and that Robert
Sasser 5 and Carolina Skiff conspired to drive Sundance out of busi13
ness.
In ruling for the Sassers, the trial court held that the Georgia
Securities Act ("the Act") was not applicable, and that even if it had been
applicable, Bell himself had violated the Act. 136 The court of appeals
relied on a two-pronged analysis established by the Georgia Supreme
Court for determining whether stock is a security within the meaning of
the Act. 37 The initial prong was set forth in Landreth Timber Co. v.
Landreth,3 ' and is commonly known as the stock characterization test.
The second prong is commonly known as the Howey economic reality
test. 139 The Georgia Supreme Court has adopted both prongs of the
1 4
test, first in Tech Resources v. Estate of Hubbard
' and more recently
in Cohen v. William Goldberg & Co. 4 ' Under the stock characterization test, when an instrument (1) is called "stock" and (2) bears usual
characteristics of stock, the purchaser justifiably may assume the federal
securities laws apply.'42 The characteristics usually associated with
common stock are "(i) the right to receive dividends contingent upon an
apportionment of the profits, (ii) negotiability, (iii) the ability to be
pledged or hypothecated, (iv) the conferring of voting rights in proportion
to the number of shares owned, and (v) the capacity to appreciate in
value.' ' 41 Only if stock does not satisfy the criteria outlined in the
stock characterization test should a court analyze whether the economic

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id. at 843-44, 520 S.E.2d at 290.
Id. at 844, 520 S.E.2d at 290.
Id. at 850, 520 S.E.2d at 294.
Id. at 845, 520 S.E.2d at 291.
Id.
471 U.S. 681, 686 (1985).
See SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946).
246 Ga. 583, 584, 272 S.E.2d 314, 316 (1980).
262 Ga. 606, 608-09, 423 S.E.2d 231, 232-33 (1992).
Id. at 607-08, 423 S.E.2d at 232 (citing Landreth, 471 U.S. at 685-86).
238 Ga. App. at 845, 520 S.E.2d at 291 (quoting Landreth, 471 U.S. at 686).
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reality test has been met.'"
Under the economic reality test, a
transaction constitutes a securities transaction if there is (1) an
investment, (2) a reasonable expectation of profits, and (3) reliance on
the management of another party to create the profits.'45
The trial court concluded that it was "difficult, if not impossible, to
analyze [this case] under the Landreth stock characterization test" and,
therefore, immediately applied the "economic reality" test.'46 Under
the framework of the stock characterization test, the court of appeals
affirmed the trial court's denial of Bell's motion for summary judgment
and reversed the trial court's grant of the Sassers' motion for summary
judgment. 4 ' The court held that this case was similar to Landreth
and Cohen and that the "transaction clearly involved stock." 4 '
As evidence under the stock characterization test that Sundance stock
was a security, the court noted that: (1) Sundance had only one class of
stock in its articles of incorporation and, therefore, all stockholders were
entitled to dividends; (2) Sundance by-laws permitted transfers of the
stock, and Bell had in fact purchased the stock, so the shares were
negotiable; (3) no evidence was presented to demonstrate that the shares
could not be pledged; (4) each stockholder was entitled to49 one vote per
share; and (5) Sundance stock could appreciate in value.
Next,- the court reversed the Sassers' motion for summary judgment. 150 The court rejected the Sassers' arguments that Bell lacked
standing, that Sundance stock was exempt from registration, that Bell
equally violated Georgia securities laws, and that Bell had failed to
tender the stock.' 5' Consequently, "the Sassers [were] liable to Bell
under OCGA § 10-5-14(a) for the sale of unregistered securities, but the
amount of recovery to which Bell [was] entitled remain[ed] in dispute.' 52
With regard to Bell's conspiracy claim, the court held Bell failed to
carry his burden of proof; therefore, the Sassers and Carolina Skiff
153
should have been granted summary judgment.

144. Id.
145. Id.; see also Cohen v. William Goldberg & Co., 262 Ga. 606, 607, 423 S.E.2d 231,
232 (1992).
146. 238 Ga. App. at 845, 520 S.E.2d at 291.
147. Id. at 850, 520 S.E.2d at 294.
148. Id. at 846, 520 S.E.2d at 292.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 847, 520 S.E.2d at 292.
151. Id. at 847-48, 520 S.E.2d at 292-93.
152. Id. at 850, 520 S.E.2d at 294.
153. Id. at 853, 520 S.E.2d at 296.
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Similar to the analysis in Bell, in Cox v. Edelson,' the Court of
Appeals of Georgia was presented with the issue of whether a security
had been sold. Although the case set forth few facts, the record showed
Gerald Cox invested in Hank and Sue Ann Edelson's office furniture'
business.'5 5 Soon thereafter Cox filed suit "alleging that the Edelson's
knowingly made false statements that induced him to invest in their
[business] to his detriment."156
In three separate orders, the trial court (1) denied Cox's motion for
summary judgment as to his claim for breach of contract and violation
of securities laws; (2) granted Edelson's motion for summary judgment
as to Cox's claim for breach of contract and violation of securities laws;
and (3) granted summary judgment to the Edelsons on five of the seven
counts raised in Cox's amended complaint. Cox appealed the grant of
summary judgment to the Edelsons regarding breach of contract and
violation of securities laws, and the Edelsons cross-appealed to challenge
the denial -of summary judgment as to Cox's claim for fraud and
misrepresentation.

'

While the trial court held Cox's investment in the Edelsons' company
did not "meet the definition of a security," the Court of Appeals of
Georgia reversed, holding the stock Cox purchased was a security subject
to the Georgia Securities Act ("Act"). 58 The trial court applied the
economic reality test, but the court of appeals did not "[b]ecause Cox's
investment meets the definition of a security."'5 9 As stated above in
the review of Bell, the Georgia Supreme Court adopted a two-part test
in Cohen to analyze when an investment equals a security: "[T]he initial
test must be the 'stock characterization' test," and "[o]nly if it does not
meet the requirements of that test must we apply the 'economic' reality
test. " 16o

Under the stock characterization test, there is a two-part analysis.
The first question is whether the instrument sold is called "stock," and
the second question is whether the instrument sold "bears the usual
characteristics of stock." 161 If both questions are answered in the
affirmative, "a purchaser justifiably may assume that securities laws
apply."'62 Under the Act, a security is defined as:
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

243 Ga. App. 5, 530 S.E.2d 250 (2000).
Id. at 5, 530 S.E.2d at 251.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 7, 530 S.E.2d at 252.
Id.
Id. at 6, 530 S.E.2d at 251-52.
Id., 530 S.E.2d at 252.
Id.
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any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of indebtedness, investment certificate, certificate of
interest or participation in any profit sharing agreement, . . . transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, limited
partnership interest, or beneficial interest in profits or earnings, or any
other instrument commonly known as a security.. . ."'
Even though both courts noted that Cox's purchase was a "stock
purchase," the court of appeals found it necessary to analyze the
4
characteristics of the particular investment vehicle sold to Cox.'6
Typical characteristics associated with common stock are "(1) the right
to receive dividends contingent upon an apportionment of profits; (2)
negotiability; (3) the ability to be pledged or hypothecated; (4) the
conferring of voting rights in proportion to the number of shares owned;
and (5) the capacity to appreciate in value."'6 5 Additionally, any
investment that qualifies as a security must
be registered unless there
16
is an applicable exemption for the sale. 1
In the subscription agreement under which Cox purchased his shares,
he acknowledged that the shares were not registered and that the
company was not obligated to register the shares or make an exemption.
Cox also agreed to strict limitations on his right to resell or transfer the
shares. Furthermore, Cox made a representation that he would not
present evidence to show he had any right to receive dividends, to
participate in voting, or to gain value in the stock. 67 Although these
facts do not, on their face, embody the characteristics of stock, "the
[Georgia] Supreme Court found that neither restrictions on the
negotiability of stock in a closely-held corporation, nor its unregistered
status negated the stock's character as a security."68 Therefore, "the
Georgia securities laws contemplate that stock may be a security and yet
be unregistered."' 6 9 Once the court determined Cox's investment met
the stock characterization test, there was no need for the court to apply
the economic reality test; however, genuine issues of material facts still
existed regarding whether the Edelsons made fraudulent statements. 7 ° Therefore, the court of appeals remanded the case to the

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 7, 530 S.E.2d at 252.
See O.C.G.A. § 10-5-5 (1994).
243 Ga. App. at 7, 530 S.E.2d at 252.
Id.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 7-8, 530 S.E.2d at 252-53.
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trial court for determination of count seven-Cox's allegation that the
Edelsons had violated the securities laws.'7 1
C. ForwardLooking Statements Accompanied by Cautionary
Statements Did Not Violate the Georgia Securities Act
Harris v. Ivax Corp.'72 involved a class action suit alleging that Ivax
Corp. ("Ivax"), its chairman and CEO, and its CFO had committed fraud
under the Securities Exchange Act Section 10(b) and Securities and
Exchange Commission Rule 10(b)-5. The complaint filed by a group of
investors in Ivax stemmed from several press releases issued by Ivax
and the subsequent announcement of a $179 million loss. Ivax issued
press releases in both August and September 1996. Those press releases
stated optimism and specifically set forth an anticipated loss of $43
million. However, in November 1999, Ivax announced a $179 million
loss with the greatest portion of the loss being derived from a reduction
in goodwill associated with certain Ivax businesses. The $104 million
attributed to the goodwill reduction was not mentioned in either press
73
release, and Ivax's stock price plummeted.'
Ivax's investors claimed that the economic projections for the company
were fraudulent and that Ivax knew the omission of the possible
goodwill writedown was misleading. Ivax defended its position by
claiming protection under the safe harbor provisions of the Securities
Exchange Act and arguing that Ivax's investors had not met the newly
enacted heightened pleading standard under the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA"). The district court dismissed Ivax's
investors claims, and the investors appealed seeking a review of the
dismissal of the complaint and arguing the district court should have
granted them leave to amend their complaint if they had not met the
17 4
heightened pleading standards under the PSLRA.
The PSLRA provides a safe harbor for forward-looking statements if
the statements are "accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements
identifying important factors that could cause actual results to differ
materially from those in the forward-looking statement."'75 If the safe
harbor requirement is met, an individual or corporation will not be held
liable if the forward-looking statement ultimately proves to have been
false.' 76 Additionally, the safe harbor requires that even if a forward-

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Id. at 9, 530 S.E.2d at 254.
182 F.3d 799 (11th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 802.
Id.
Id. at 803 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1)(A)(i) (Supp. IV 1998)).
Id.
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looking statement does not have the appropriate cautionary language,
a plaintiff must prove defendant had actual knowledge that the forwardlooking statement was in fact false or misleading.' v As was required
in Sturm, the heightened pleading standards mandate that a plaintiff
seeking to obtain recovery for securities fraud must "allege specific facts
that raise a 'strong inference' of the 'required state of mind' on the part
of the officers responsible for an allegedly fraudulent statement." 178
Not only did the district court conclude all statements were forwardlooking and were accompanied by appropriate cautionary language, but
the district court also held plaintiffs had failed
to satisfy the new
9
pleading standards required under the PSLRA.1
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, affirming the district court's
decision, held Ivax's statements were all forward-looking and accompanied by "meaningful cautionary language."8 ° Additionally, the court
held that because the press releases issued by Ivax were covered under
the safe harbor provision, there was no need to "enter the thicket of the
PSLRA's new pleading requirements for scienter; if a statement is
accompanied by meaningful cautionary language, 'the defendant's
statement of mind is irrelevant.'"' 8' A forward-looking statement is
defined as
(A) a statement containing a projection of revenues, income (including
income lost), earnings, (including earnings lost) per share, capital
expenditures, dividends, capital structure, or other financial items; (B)
a statement of the plans and objectives of management for future
operations, including plans or objectives relating to the products or
services of the issuer; (C) a statement of future economic performance,
including any such statement contained in a discussion and analysis
of financial condition by the management or in the results of operations
included pursuant to the rules and regulations of the commission; (D)
any statement of the assumptions underlying or relating to any
statement described in sub-paragraph (A), (B), or (C); (E) any report
issued by an outside reviewer retained by an issuer, to the extent that
the report assesses a forward-looking statement made by the issuer; or
(F) a statement containing a projection or estimate of such other items
as may be specified by rule or regulation of the Commission.'82

177. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1)(B)).
178. Id.
179. Id.

180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 805 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(i)(1)).
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The Eleventh Circuit then scrutinized several statements under the
framework and definition of a forward-looking statement.'8 3 The court
concluded each statement it analyzed fell comfortably within one of the
subsections defining a forward-looking statement.184
The first forward-looking statement analyzed was "reorders are
expected to improve as customer inventories are depleted."' 85 Because
"the test makes clear that an expected increase in reorders was one of
the bases of the optimism," the court held this sort of statement was
indeed "a statement of the assumptions underlying a statement of future
economic performance."" 6 The second statement analyzed by the court
was "the challenges unique to this period in our history are now behind
us." 7 Although plaintiffs argued the CEO's use of present tense in
his statement made the statement fall outside the scope of the forwardlooking safe harbor, the court was not persuaded and held a statement
"about the state of a company whose truth or falsity is discernable only
188
after it is made necessarily refers only to future performance."
Therefore, the statement was based on future economic performance as
provided under- subsection (C) of the definition of a "forward-looking"
statement. 89 The third statement by Ivax was the following: "Our
fundamental business and its underlying strategies remain intact ....
Only a limited number of companies are positioned to meaningfully
participate in this rapidly growing market and, among them, WAX is
certainly very well positioned."' 9 As with the second statement, the
court held that while the CEO's choice of words involved language
identifying a present condition, the use of the word "intact" and "wellpositioned" is language "whose
truth can only be known after seeing how
19
Ivax's future plays out."

1

Finally, in the fourth statement examined by the court, Ivax listed
multiple factors that could influence third quarter results for the
company. Because the factors included both forward-looking statements
and statements that were not forward-looking, the question presented
was whether "the safe harbor benefits the entire statement or only parts

183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.

at 804.
at 803.
at 804.
at 805.
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Plaintiffs argued the whole statement was misleading

because it is the whole statement that omits the expectation of a
goodwill writedown.'9 3 For the purposes of analyzing the entire
statement, the court pointed to extrinsic sources of congressional intent
and stated the "safe harbor provision was enacted in order to loosen the
'muzzling effect' of potential liability for forward-looking statements
which often kept investors in the dark about what management foresaw
for the company."' 94 Therefore, if the court were to hold an entire
statement that contains both forward-looking and non-forward-looking
statements as outside of the safe harbor, the intent of Congress to foster
communication would be hindered.'9 5 Moreover, the court recognized
that because that holding could create a potential loop hole:
a list or explanation would only qualify for this treatment if it
contained assumptions underlying a forward-looking statement.
Investors should know, under the statutory scheme, that relying on
assumptions is dangerous; there will often be no legal recourse even if
the assumption is false. Second, a defendant can fully benefit from the
safe harbor's shelter only when it is disclosed risk factors in a warning
accompanying the forward-looking statement. This disclosure
as well
196
should warn investors against blind reliance on mixed lists.

After determining that all statements were in fact forward-looking
statements, the Eleventh Circuit then analyzed the district court's
conclusion that adequate cautionary language accompanied the forwardlooking statements.' v The press releases included "detailed and
informative" cautionary provisions, but did not include specific warnings
about a potential goodwill writedown. 9 ' Therefore, the question
presented was whether cautionary language must "explicitly mention the
factor that ultimately belies a forward-looking statement."' 99 The
Eleventh Circuit held it did not and further annunciated that the statute
only required "important factors that could cause actual results to differ
materially from those in the forward-looking statement" be addressed
and not "all factors." 20 0

Additionally, a conference report that accom-

panied the PSLRA clearly specified that "failure to include the particular

192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

Id. at 806.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 806-07.
Id. at 807.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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factor that ultimately causes the forward-looking statement not to come
true will not mean that the statement is not protected by the safe
harbor."201
When claiming fraud under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and
Rule 10b-5, the decision in Harris provides sound guidance to any
Georgia corporation and its counsel with regard to forward-looking
statements and the applicable safe harbor provided under the securities
laws. Harris also provides guidance in the delicate arena of the
heightened pleading requirements of the PSLRA.
III.

PARTNERSHIP

A. Court of Appeals of Georgia Upholds Substance Over Form and
Protects PartnershipAssets From Judgment Creditor
In Aaron Rents Inc. v. Fourteenth Street Venture, L.P ,2°2 Aaron
Rents was granted a $559,114 judgment against Shepherd. Shepherd
and others had breached warranties contained in the sale of his company
to Aaron Rents. Two years later, Fourteenth Street Associates, which
was fifty percent owned by Shepherd, conveyed essentially all of 'its
property to Fourteenth Street Venture, L.P. ("L.P."). Aaron Rents filed
a declaratory judgment to secure its debt on the transferred property,
and LP. and Life of Virginia, a secured creditor that held a 1994 deed
on the property to secure debt, filed for summary judgment. The trial
court granted summary judgment in favor of L.P. and Life of Virginia,
and Aaron Rents appealed.0 3
Aaron Rents argued Shepherd and his partner did not form a
partnership when they originally created Fourteenth Street Associates,
but instead formed a joint venture. Although the language in the
contract that formed Fourteenth Street Associates identified Fourteenth
Street Associates as a "joint venture" instead of a "partnership," the
substance of the agreement proved the intent of the parties to be
otherwise.24 The agreement set forth the following:
Fourteenth Street Associates was formed to acquire property for profit,
that both Shepherd and Stalker had to consent to any other business
by the association, that neither Shepherd nor Stalker had any
authority to act alone on behalf of the association, that Shepherd and
Stalker each had a 50% interest in the association's assets and profits

201.
202.
203.
204.

Id.
243 Ga. App. 746, 533 S.E.2d 759 (2000).
Id. at 747, 533 S.E.2d at 761.
Id.
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and losses, that Shepherd and Stalker each contributed $25,000 in
capital to the association, that each of them bore the risks of the
association's business." 5
The court of appeals held that as a matter of law Shepherd and Stalker
had an intent to contribute equal amounts to share risks, control, and
assets; therefore, they essentially formed a partnership.0 6 Additionally, as may be common with distinctions between joint ventures and
partnerships, no distinction was met in this case. Stalker and Shepherd
intended to participate and share jointly in property, profits, losses, and
control. 20 7 As such, the court held the partnership property was in the
partnership's name and was not individual real property owned by a
single partner and, therefore, was not subject to Aaron Rents' lien
against the individual partner.0 8
B. Conveyance of Property to a Joint Venture is Insufficient to Give
Notice of Partnership'sInterests in the Property
In Accolades Apartments, L.P v. Fulton County,0 9 which was
decided before Aaron Rents, the court of appeals addressed the issue of
whether certain real property had been placed into a partnership or
whether the property, which was transferred to "the joint venture by its
name alone," was not partnership property.21 ° If the property had
been transferred into the partnership, it would have been protected from
condemnation proceedings by the IRS, the Georgia Department of
Revenue, and Coyote Portfolio, LLC (collectively, "the Creditors"), but if
the property merely was transferred to the joint venture, the Creditors
would be entitled to reach the property.21' The court reiterated that
"when title to property is placed in the name of the partnership, the
question of individual shielding assets and secret partnerships is
eliminated."212
After reviewing the record, the court held the transfer of property to
the joint venture name alone was "insufficient to give notice of a
partnership interest therein."213
Moreover, the court noted that
Georgia law does not recognize a joint venture as a distinct legal entity

205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Id. at 748, 533 S.E.2d at 761-62.
Id..
Id.
Id. at 748-49, 533 S.E.2d at 762.
242 Ga. App. 214, 528 S.E.2d 268 (2000).
Id. at 215, 528 S.E.2d at 270.
Id.
Id.
Id.

MERCER LAW REVIEW

124

[Vol. 52

separate from its owners. 1 4 For these reasons, the court held that the
Creditors were entitled to disbursements from the property and that
Accolades Apartments, as the successor in interest to the joint venture,
was not.215
C.

Limited PartnersAre Liable for State Taxes

In Department of Revenue v. Sledge,16 the Georgia Department of
Revenue denied Tennessee residents' application for a refund of income
taxes assessed against them. The Tennessee residents were William and
Mary Sledge. The Sledges were limited partners in two separate
Georgia limited partnerships. The Georgia limited partnerships had
their principal place of business in Georgia, and all partnership-related
activities were conducted in Georgia by the general partners, who were
Georgia residents. Even though the Sledges were merely passive limited
partners and the partnership only invested in a New York brokerage
account, the partnership withheld Georgia income taxes on the Sledges'
share of profits." '
At trial, the Fulton County Superior Court reversed the Georgia
Department of Revenue's denial to refund Georgia income taxes withheld
from the Sledges during the years 1992 through 1994.218 On appeal,
"[t]he Sledges contend that O.C.G.A. § 48-7-24 taxes the profits of a
partnership only if the individual member does business in Georgia and
that, because they personally did not do business in Georgia, they owed
no income tax on their share of the partnership profits." 1 9 However,
220
the Court of Appeals of Georgia held that the "statute is plain."
O.C.G.A. section 48-7-24 states: "When one or more of the individual
members of a partnership doing business in the state are nonresidents
of this state, the nonresidents shall be taxable on their share of the net
profits of the partnership." 22' The literal meaning of the statute
contradicted the Sledges' argument, and the court held that "where a
partnership does business in Georgia, its individual members are taxable
on their share of the net profits of the partnership-regardless of
whether the individual members qualify as doing business in Geor-

214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

Id.
Id. at 216, 528 S.E.2d at 270.
241 Ga. App. 833, 528 S.E.2d 260 (2000).
Id. at 833, 528 S.E.2d at 261.
Id.
Id. at 834, 528 S.E.2d at 261.
Id.
Id. at 833, 528 S.E.2d at 261; see also O.C.G.A. § 48-7-24(a) (1995 & Supp. 2000).

20001

BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS

gia. ' ' 222 The Sledges also contended the limited partnership did not do
business in Georgia because it merely invested in the New York
brokerage account. However, the court of appeals disagreed and held
that it "must be guided by the general principle of Georgia law that 'the
phrase' 'doing business' means any activity or transaction for the
purpose of financial profit or gain." 223 Therefore, because a partnership by definition will be formed to achieve profits, it is inevitable that
a limited partnership engaged in the activity of financial profit or gain
will always be doing business under Georgia law.
D.

PartnerLiability for PartnershipDebts

In McCollum v. O'Dell,224 Glenn McCollum, Robert O'Dell, and
Basile Antonelli entered into a handwritten agreement prepared by
Antonelli and McCollum. The agreement was three sentences long and
essentially set forth a $25,000 loan agreement.22
The Court of
Appeals of Georgia stated, "This case presents a perfect example of what
happens when lay persons exercise their right to draft a legal document."22 1 Under the agreement, Glenn McCollum loaned $25,000 to
Antonelli's Restaurant, Inc., and in return, McCollum was to receive an
option to buy into Antonelli's as a full partner. However, after
depositing $25,000 into a business checking account, the restaurant
failed, and McCollum was not repaid for his loan. McCollum then
brought suit against what he claimed to be the partnership with O'Dell
and Antonelli. As a partner, O'Dell would be liable for any partnership
debts due and payable. O'Dell, on the other hand, argued the loan was
made to Basile Antonelli, individually, and not the partnership. At trial,
the court ruled in favor of O'Dell, holding the money was a loan to

222. 241 Ga. App. at 834, 528 S.E.2d at 261.
223. Id., 528 S.E.2d at 262.
224. 241 Ga. App. 6, 525 S.E.2d 721 (1999).
225. Id. at 6-7, 525 S.E.2d at 722. The full text of the agreement is as follows:
This agreement between Glenn McCollum and Antonelli's Restaurant Inc. is
borrowing [sic] the sum of twenty-five thousand dollars from Glenn McCollum.
Payment agreement between parties is monthly payment of 650.00 per month
starting with the first payment due Jan. 1, 1996 for the total payments of 48
months for total amount of thirty one thousand and two hundred dollars.
Antonelli's Inc is giving a 6 month option for Glenn McCollum to come in as a full
partner starting date Jan. 1, 1996 expiring July 1, 1996 for the total sum fee of
one hundred and twenty five thousand dollars paid into Antonelli's corp. as Glenn
McCollum options if during 6 month grace period expires Glenn McCollum has the
option to refuse partnership and Antonelli will continue to make payments to 48
month contract.
Id. at 7, 525 S.E.2d at 722.
226. Id. at 6, 525 S.E.2d at 722.
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Antonelli personally.2 27 On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Georgia
held the trial court's ruling rested on "erroneous legal theory" and
reversed and remanded the decision to the trial court to determine
"whether the parties intended that the loan be made to the business or
228
to Antonelli individually."
The difficulty in this decision rested on the "inexpertly drafted,"
"ambiguous" and "poorly worded" nature of the agreement. 229 The
contract referred to Antonelli in several different respects.
First,
Antonelli signed in his individual capacity as Basile Antonelli; second,
McCollum loaned the money to an entity referred to as "Antonelli's
Restaurant, 2Inc.,"
"Antonelli's, Inc.," "Antonelli's corp.," and the
"partnership." ° If the loan was a "business" loan as opposed to a
personal loan to Antonelli, then "all partners [would be] jointly and
severally liable for all debts, obligations, and liabilities of the partnership," including McCollum's $25,000.231
O'Dell also attempted to hide behind the corporate veil by claiming he
believed the business had been incorporated when he signed the
agreement. If the business actually had been a corporation, O'Dell
would have been protected as an officer or director of the corporation,
free from personal liability on corporate debts.232 The court of appeals,
however, held that "there [was] no evidence supporting the trial court's
finding that O'Dell thought the business had been incorporated when he
signed the contract," and, in fact, "O'Dell [had] testified unequivocally
that the business was never incorporated and that he knew, at the time
he signed the contract, that the business was operating as a partnership."233 While this case provides little new guidance with regard to
Georgia partnership law, it emphasizes the importance of competent
legal counsel in forming the legal relationship intended by the parties.
IV.

RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS

2 34

In Georgia, as is common in other states, the courts have adopted a
fairly straightforward analytical structure regarding noncompetition and
nonsolicitation agreements.
Courts analyze three factors when

227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 7-8, 525 S.E.2d at 722.
at 10, 525 S.E.2d at 724.
at 9, 525 S.E.2d at 723.
at 10, 525 S.E.2d at 724.
at 8, 525 S.E.2d at 723.

233. Id.
234. The authors would like to thank Michael E. Ross, Partner in the firm of King &
Spalding, Atlanta, Georgia, for his guidance in the preparation of this section.
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determining the reasonableness of the challenged restrictions, including
(1) duration, (2) territorial coverage, and (3) scope of the prohibited
of the imposed restraint is
activity.235 The question of reasonableness
36
a question of law for the court.

It is worth noting that "blue penciling" of an offending restrictive
covenant in a pure employment agreement (as opposed to restrictive
covenants incorporated in the sale of a business) is prohibited under
Georgia law, even if the contract includes a severability clause.2 37 In
an employment agreement, a covenant not to compete or a nonsolicitation agreement must stand on its own or fail in its entirety; thus, it is
advisable to scrutinize these clauses and reference the prevailing law
prior to committing to specific language.
NonCompete Covenants
In Herndon v. Waller,235 the Court of Appeals of Georgia struck
2 39
down a noncompete covenant in a veterinarian's lease agreement.
Waller, the veterinarian, brought a declaratory judgment action to
invalidate the noncompete covenant.24 The court of appeals first held
the noncompete covenant should be analyzed under the strict scrutiny
accorded to restrictive covenants in employment contracts rather than
under the relaxed standard, including blue-penciling, which is allowed
with restrictive covenants in connection with the sale of a business.2 4'
The court reasoned the noncompete covenant reflected the unequal
bargaining power inherent in employment contracts because (1) Waller,
as lessee, was essentially in the same position as the buyer of a
business, not the seller, and (2) Waller received no separate consider-

A.

235. See generally Sysco Food Servs. of Atlanta v. Chupp, 225 Ga. App. 584, 585, 484
S.E.2d 323, 325 (1997); Pittman v. Harbin Clinic Prof'l Ass'n, 210 Ga. App. 767, 769, 437
S.E.2d 619, 622 (1993).
236. Rollins Protective Servs. Co. v. Palermo, 249 Ga. 138, 139, 287 S.E.2d 546, 548
(1982). The reasonableness analysis is informed by the following structure: A court will
apply (1) strict scrutiny to restrictive covenants ancillary to employment agreements; (2)
a middle level of scrutiny to restrictive covenants found in professional partnership
agreements; and (3)a much lesser degree of scrutiny to restrictive covenants ancillary to
the sale of a business. See Habif, Arogeti & Wynne, P.C. v. Baggett, 231 Ga. App. 289,
289-90, 498 S.E.2d 346, 349 (1998).
237. See, e.g., Harville v. Gunter, 230 Ga. App. 198, 200, 495 S.E.2d 862, 863 (1998);
McNease v. National Motor Club, 238 Ga. 53, 56, 231 S.E.2d 58, 59 (1976).
238. 241 Ga. App. 494, 525 S.E.2d 159 (1999).
239. Id. at 495, 525 S.E.2d at 160.
240. Id. at 494, 525 S.E.2d at 160.
241. Id. at 495, 525 S.E.2d at 161 (citing Baggett, 231 Ga. App. at 289-90, 498 S.E.2d
at 349).
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ation for the noncompete covenant.242 Curiously, however, even though
the lessor, Herndon, was also a veterinarian, the court of appeals did not
analyze this case using the new middle tier level of review for restrictive
covenants ancillary to professional partnership agreements.2 43
Waller prevailed in the trial court on the ground that the geographic
term of the noncompete covenant was too vague to be enforced. 2"
Nonetheless, the court of appeals concluded the noncompete covenant
"was not reasonable in light of the nature of the business and the
parties' situation."245 In reaching this conclusion it pointed out that
(1) Herndon had not practiced veterinary medicine at the leased
premises for more than six years when he leased it to Waller; (2) while
the tenant immediately prior to Waller was also a veterinarian, he
defaulted on the lease, and the office had been in disrepair for several
months before it was leased to Waller; and (3) less than ten percent of
Waller's clients were carryovers from this previous tenant or any other
veterinarians who had worked out of the office earlier. 246 The court of
appeals found that "[tlhe customers serviced at the leased premises,
therefore, were Waller's and not Herndon's."247
In Ceramic & Metal Coatings Corp. v. Hizer,245 the Court of Appeals
of Georgia struck down a noncompete covenant in an employment
contract for a sales representative because it was overly broad in its
territory and scope of prohibited activities.24 9 Specifically, the noncompete covenant failed because it: (1) applied to all of Georgia and Florida
even though Hizer sold to customers only in five counties in Florida and
three counties in Georgia; (2) provided that the territory would be
expanded to include "any territory added during the course of [his]
Agreement"; and (3) imposed a paradigm "in any capacity" restriction on
Hizer's ability to go to work for a competitor.25 ° In short, this opinion
was routine as analyzed by the court, and CMC could not have prevailed
under the current noncompete law in Georgia. It is interesting to note
that CMC was seeking to have the court apply the new "middle tier"
level of review which it refused to do.

242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 494-95, 525 S.E.2d at 160. The noncompete agreement reads as follows:
"[Waller] agrees not to operate as a Veterinarian for a distance of fifteen (15) miles." Id.
at 494, 525 S.E.2d at 160.
245. Id. at 496, 525 S.E.2d at 161.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. 242 Ga. App. 391, 529 S.E.2d 160 (2000).
249. Id. at 391, 529 S.E.2d at 162.
250. Id. at 393-94, 529 S.E.2d at 163-64.
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In Hogan Management Services, P.C. v. Martino,25 a nonsolicitation
agreement in a physician's services contract was plainly unenforceable
because it lacked any time limitation, had no territorial limitation, and
prohibited Martino from soliciting any patients.2 52 Additionally, the
court emphasized its lack of authority to alter or "blue-pencil" the
nonsolicitation clause.2 53
In Kuehn v. Selton & Associates,2' Brad Kuehn was a commercial
real estate agent and broker whose noncompete agreement with Selton
& Associates likewise failed because it had neither a specified territory
nor a definite expiration date. 5
Notably, however, the court of
appeals suggested that this noncompete covenant might have passed
muster if it had been confined to real estate clients served by Kuehn." 6 This dictum may help remove any lingering doubt after Mouyal
that both noncompete and nonsolicitation covenants in Georgia can
define their territories by reference to the actual or prospective
customers contacted by the ex-employee instead of by reference to
geographical terms.257
In AGA, LLC v. Rubin,25 the court of appeals struck down a noncompete covenant that prohibited an employee-gastroenterologist, for
eighteen months after termination of his employment, from rendering
gastroenterology services, except in an emergency situation, at or within
five miles of any hospital where he regularly performed services for his
employer-group at any time during the term of his employment.259
The court of appeals held this noncompete covenant was facially invalid
"because the territory was not determinable until the time of the
employee's termination."26 ° In doing so, the court overruled its earlier
opinion, which upheld a noncompete covenant with a similarly "moving"

251. 242 Ga. App. 791, 530 S.E.2d 508 (2000).
252. Id. at 793, 530 S.E.2d at 510. Note, however, in Cobb Family Dentistry, P.C. v.
Reich, 259 Ga. 450, 383 S.E.2d 891 (1989), which the Georgia Supreme Court discussed
with approval in W.R. Grace & Co. v. Mouyal, 262 Ga. 464, 467,422 S.E.2d 529, 533 (1992),
the Court had no problem with a nonsolicitation covenant that covered not only Dr. Reich's
own patients, but any patients seen by her office. 259 Ga. at 451, 383 S.E.2d at 892.
These results are not surprising, although dicta in Martino leaves room for some head
scratching.
253. 242 Ga. App. at 793, 530 S.E.2d at 510-11.
254. 242 Ga. App. 662, 530 S.E.2d 787 (2000).
255. Id. at 664, 530 S.E.2d at 789-90. The time limitation was as follows: "as long as
Tenant remains in the building or project." Id.
256. Id., 530 S.E.2d at 790.
257. Id., 530 S.E.2d at 789-90.
258. 243 Ga. App. 772, 533 S.E.2d 804 (2000).
259. Id. at 773, 533 S.E.2d at 805-06.
260. Id. at 774, 533 S.E.2d at 806.
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Thus, Rubin confirms that drafting an enforceable
territory.2 1
noncompete covenant under Georgia law will continue to be plagued by
the difficulty of defining a territory that accurately reflects the
geographic area in which the employee works not only at the time of
entering into the noncompete covenant, but also when the employee is
terminated, which could be years later.
In Iero v. Mohawk Finishing Products, Inc.,262 David Iero was a
former salesman for Mohawk who lived and was based in Georgia for
twelve years. He quit and went to work for a competitor, which
prompted a sword rattling letter from Mohawk reminding him of his
noncompete and nondisclosure covenants. Iero then filed suit in Fulton
Superior Court seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief
against enforcement of the covenants. Mohawk moved to dismiss
pursuant to the New York forum selection clause in Iero's employment
agreement.263
The trial court dismissed the case, and the court of appeals affirmed.M Although it was undisputed that the covenants were invalid
under Georgia law, the court held it would not violate Georgia public
policy to enforce the "freely negotiated forum selection clause," at least
so far as Iero "does not even address whether the New York court would
apply New York law."265 In reaching this conclusion, the court of
appeals held it was not enough that litigating in New York would be
inconvenient for Iero absent any contention, much less any proof, that
"enforcement of the forum selection clause would deprive him of his day
266
in court."
To be sure, the court of appeals left open the possibility that it might
have ruled differently upon a showing that a New York court would
uphold the covenants.267 Moreover, Iero does not indicate whether a
Georgia court would honor a judgment or injunction entered by a New
York court enforcing the covenants.

261.
(1994).
262.
263.
264.
265.

Id.; see Dominy v. National Emergency Servs., 215 Ga. App. 537, 451 S.E.2d 472
243 Ga. App 670, 534 S.E.2d 136 (2000).
Id. at 670, 534 S.E.2d at 137.
Id. at 672, 534 S.E.2d at 139.
Id.

266. Id.
267. Id.

2000]

B.

BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS

Nonsolicitation Covenants

In Gill v. Poe & Brown of Georgia, Inc.,2" the Court of Appeals of
Georgia struck down an eighteen month nonsolicitation-of-customers
covenant under Georgia law. 269 In doing so, the court of appeals
reversed the trial court's order granting partial summary judgment to
Poe & Brown and denying Gill's cross-motion for summary judgment on
the enforceability of the nonsolicitation covenant. °
Gill was an insurance agent who signed the nonsolicitation covenant
in 1992 while he was employed by the predecessor of Poe & Brown. The
nonsolicitation covenant was assigned to Poe & Brown without Gill's
27 1
consent when it purchased the assets of his previous employer.
With this background, the court held as follows: (1) The assignment of
the nonsolicitation covenant was valid even without Gill's consent,272
and (2) relying primarily on Smith Adcock & Co. v. Rosenbohm,27 3 the
nonsolicitation covenant was overbroad and unenforceable because it
prohibited Gill from seeking business in competition with his exemployer from any persons or entities that were his actual or actively
sought customers at any time during Gill's employment even though they
may have ended their relationship with Poe & Brown or its predecessor
as many as four years before Gill was terminated in 1996.274 As to
former clients, the court of appeals found that "Gill's employer had no
legitimate business interest in preventing Gill's solicitation."275
Moreover, the court of appeals suggested that nonsolicitation-ofcustomers covenants will not pass muster, unless, like the nonsolicitation covenant that was at issue in Rosenbohm, they are limited to
customers or prospects with which the employee, or perhaps the
employer for existing accounts set up by the employee, had some
business contact within at least the two years immediately prior to
termination of employment.2 76

268. 241 Ga. App. 580, 524 S.E.2d 328 (1999).
269. Id. at 580, 524 S.E.2d at 329.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 580-81, 524 S.E.2d at 329-30.
272. Id. at 582, 524 S.E.2d at 330. The two cases cited by the court of appeals,
however, do not really support this ruling. See Swanson v. Kirby, 98 Ga. 586, 594, 26
S.E.2d 71, 74 (1896); USS Corp. of America v. Parker, 202 Ga. App. 374, 375-76,414 S.E.2d
513, 515 (1991).
273. 238 Ga. App. 281, 284-85, 518 S.E.2d 708, 711 (1999).
274. 241 Ga. App. at 583, 524 S.E.2d at 331.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 582, 524 S.E.2d at 331; see also W.R. Grace & Co. v. Mouyal, 262 Ga. 464,
466, 422 S.E.2d 529, 532 (1992).
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AGENCY

CEO Possessed "InherentAgency"

In Family Partners Worldwide, Inc. v. SunTrust Bank, Atlanta,277
Family Partners Worldwide, Inc. operated under a corporate structure
with two corporations: one arranged and facilitated international

adoptions ("Family Partners Worldwide") and the second operated as a
foundation raising funds for the adoptions ("Family Partners Foundation," and together with Family Partners Worldwide "Family Partners").
Both corporations had the same corporate governance with identical
boards of directors and with Keith McGrew as their CEO. McGrew
allegedly embezzled funds from Family Partners Worldwide.2 " After
McGrew set up a bank account with SunTrust Bank under the Family
Partners Foundation name, he "allegedly used [that account] to convert
funds from Family Partners. '7 9 In its attempt to recover the embezzled funds, Family Partners sued SunTrust, "contending SunTrust was
liable because it did not require a corporate resolution or certificate of
authority to open either account.
In granting summary judgment
in favor of SunTrust, the trial court held the CEO had "inherent agency
power to open the accounts."2 8'
On appeal, the court of appeals held SunTrust did not know of the
alleged embezzlement; therefore, the only issue to be determined was
"whether McGrew as CEO had either the authority or inherent agency
power to open the account and designate himself as the authorized
signatory for withdrawals."282 Inherent agency power is defined as
"'the power of an agent which is derived not from authority, apparent
authority or estoppel, but solely from the agency relation and exists for
the protection of persons harmed by or dealing with a servant or other
agent.'" 28" As CEO, McGrew had the following powers and characteristics: (1) He was the most senior executive in both corporations; (2) he
had uncontested power to operate the corporation on a daily basis; (3) he
had the authority to execute contracts on behalf of the corporation; and

277. 242 Ga. App. 618, 530 S.E.2d 742 (2000).
278. Id. at 618, 530 S.E.2d at 743.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 619, 530 S.E.2d at 743.
283. Id. (quoting Trust Co. of Georgia v. Nationwide Moving & Storage Co., 235 Ga.
229, 232, 219 S.E.2d 162, 165 (1975)).
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(4) he had the authority to hire and fire employees. 2" Additionally,
"McGrew sat on the finance committee of the boards and had complete
authority to oversee and supervise the financial end of the businesses,
including the authority to communicate with outside accountants and
attorneys."28 5 McGrew "had the implied power to interact with banks
by obtaining information in receiving and reconciling monthly bank
statements," and "he had the authority to endorse and deposit checks in
Family Partners' other three accounts at NationsBank, wire monies from
those accounts, and serve as an authorized sole signatory on corporate
checks and payroll checks drawn at NationsBank."2 6 He had the
"implied authority to incur reasonable business expenses, purchase
supplies, and pay invoices and other corporate debts such as payroll
taxes, refunds, liability insurance, and repair bills."28 7 In light of the
overwhelming evidence and "plenary scope of his power," McGrew's
actions to withdraw the monies from the SunTrust accounts "would be
within the ordinary course of business of Family Partners and the
foundation."28 8
Regardless of the overwhelming evidence, Family Partners argued
SunTrust remained liable even though McGrew had inherent agency
power "because SunTrust failed to follow its own internal policy
requiring a corporate resolution or Certificate of Authority to establish
a corporate account." 289 In finding for SunTrust, the court of appeals
held Family Partners' argument failed because the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia has held "that 'a
bank's failure to follow its own internal operating procedures [regarding
opening accounts] cannot give rise to legal liability' for embezzlements
from that account."2 1 Moreover, the Georgia Supreme Court has held
that even though "the bank could easily protect its interest by requiring
a proper corporate resolution showing the agent's authority to act for the
corporation, that method is not the exclusive one for establishing the
existence either of authority or of inherent agency power to open a bank
account for the corporation."2 9'

284. Id., 530 S.E.2d at 743-44.
285. Id., 530 S.E.2d at 744.
286. Id. at 619-20, 530 S.E.2d at 744.
287. Id. at 620, 530 S.E.2d at 744.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id. (quoting APCOA, Inc. v. Fidelity Nat'l Bank, 703 F. Supp. 1553, 1558 (N.D. Ga.
1998)) (internal quotations omitted).
291. Id.
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BANKING

Breach of Duty

In Wachovia Bank of Georgia, N.A. v. Reynolds,292 Frances Reynolds
purchased a certificate of deposit ("CD") from Wachovia Bank of Georgia,
N.A. ("Wachovia"). Reynolds purchased the CD as attorney-in-fact for
her brother, Bernard S. Bailey, Jr., who was mentally incapacitated and
vulnerable to criminal activity.293
When Reynolds purchased the
$64,000 CD, Reynolds unequivocally instructed Wachovia that "everything pertaining to him comes to my address," and Wachovia issued an
initial deposit receipt listing "Bernard S. Bailey, Jr. by Francis B.
Reynolds, POA" as the bank's customers.294 However, Wachovia did
not follow Reynolds' instructions and "opened Mr. Bailey's CD account
in his name alone and sent everything pertaining to the account to Mr.
Bailey directly based on his existing customer profile as one of the
bank's credit card customers."295 Not surprisingly, when Mr. Bailey's
CD matured, he went to Wachovia and withdrew his entire account in
cash. After receiving the $66,722 cash in a canvas bag, Mr. Bailey
walked out of the bank. When Reynolds attempted to renew the CD, she
was told Bailey had withdrawn all of his money.29 6 When Reynolds
asked Bailey about the money, he told her "that he had asked 29 a7
maintenance man to hide the money in the attic of his apartment."
After a search of Bailey's attic proved futile, Reynolds and Bailey filed
suit against Wachovia for recovery of the money plus attorney fees.29
After a jury verdict, the trial court entered a judgment in favor of
Reynolds and Bailey that included an award of bad faith attorney
fees.299 On appeal, Wachovia argued that
(a) its duty of care extended to Mr. Bailey alone as its sole depositorcustomer and the principle for whom Ms. Reynolds acted as agent in
establishing his CD account; (b) Mr. Bailey's damages resulted from an
unforeseeable intervening criminal act of a third party foreclosing

292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.

244 Ga. App. 1, 533 S.E.2d 743 (2000).
Id. at 1, 533 S.E.2d at 744.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1-2, 533 S.E.2d at 744.
Id. at 2, 533 S.E.2d at 744.
Id.
Id.
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recovery against Wachovia; and (c) there was no evidence that Mr.
Bailey was entitled to OCGA § 13-6-11 attorney's fees for bad faith.300
The Court of Appeals of Georgia affirmed the trial court's holding and
affirmed the jury verdict, which totaled $95,598.34. °1
On appeal, Wachovia attempted to shift the analysis to its "duties
owed when the CD was withdrawn" as opposed to its "obligations and
duties owed when Ms. Reynolds originally set up the CD."3 °2 However,
the court of appeals was quick to identify that, as a financial institution,
Wachovia had a duty to issue the CD
in a manner that complie[d] with the wishes of the customer, so long
as the wishes of the customer [were] not contrary to applicable law,
and that the financial institution maybe [sic] liable to the customer or
third party beneficiary for mishandling the transaction including
improperly advising the customer how the certificate should be
established or changed to comply with the wishes of the customer.0 3
The court of appeals concluded that Ms. Reynolds' actions in opening the
account were clear and that there was no evidence contrary to applicable
law. 304 The court not only highlighted Ms. Reynolds' precision in
instructing Wachovia about the ownership and information flow
regarding the CD, but also noted that Wachovia had breached its duty
a signature card before permitting Bailey to
by failing to produce
30 5
withdraw his money.

Addressing Wachovia's claim that the superior court should have
granted its motion for a directed verdict based on "the unforeseeable
intervening criminal act of a third party," the Court of Appeals of
Georgia specified that the intervening criminal act was, in fact,
foreseeable by Wachovia and therefore could not operate to bar recovery
by Reynolds and Bailey.30 6
Lastly, the Court of Appeals of Georgia affirmed the trial court's
denial of Wachovia's motion for directed verdict as to bad faith attorney
fees under O.C.G.A. section 13-6-11." 07 The record revealed expert
testimony had been presented to determine reasonable banking
practices, and "[clontrary to [the expert testimony], Wachovia opened Mr.

300. Id., 533 S.E.2d at 744-45.
301. Id., 533 S.E.2d at 746.
302. Id., 533 S.E.2d at 745.
303. Id. (quoting Tucker Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Rawlins, 209 Ga. App. 649, 650-51,
434 S.E.2d 94, 96 (1993)).
304. Id. at 3, 533 S.E.2d at 745.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 4, 533 S.E.2d at 746.
307. Id.
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Bailey's CD account in his name alone not annotating its records to
reflect that the account was established pursuant to a power of attorney
or otherwise noting special circumstances. "' ° 8
B. Although Bank Failed to Adhere to Internal Procedures,Because
it Strictly Complied With the InternationalChamber of Commerce
Rules, Bank Was Not Liable
09
In Banco Surinvest, S.A. v. SunTrust Bank,"
the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia issued an opinion
regarding the International Chamber of Commerce's Uniform Rules for
Collections as detailed in ICC Publication No. 522 ("URC 522") and
Georgia's Commercial Code as set forth in O.C.G.A. sections 11-4-501 to 504.310 Banco Surinvest, S.A. ("Banco") helped finance a peanut trade
between Herbert A. H. Behrens, S.R.L. ("Behrens") and the Collins
Brokerage Company, LLC ("Collins Brokerage").
SunTrust Bank,
Atlanta ("SunTrust") was appointed to be the collecting bank and to
forward Collins Brokerage's payments to Banco. After Collins Brokerage
failed to make full payment under its agreement with Banco, Banco
brought suit against Collins Brokerage and SunTrust. Banco's claim
against SunTrust alleged that SunTrust violated its duties under the
agreement with Banco. zl' SunTrust allegedly breached its duties

by (1) failing to procure payment in full and failing to perfect security
interests in the shipments before delivering the title documents, (2)
allowing Collins Brokerage to draft and sign inadequate trust receipts
and commitment letters, and (3) failing to monitor Collins Brokerage's
payments and notify
Banco when Collins Brokerage did not pay the
312
Remittances in full.
However, "[n]either the contract, URC 522, nor Georgia Law imposed
upon SunTrust any duties to perform the aforementioned tasks."313
SunTrust was not required to perfect a security interest or to accept
only payments in full before transferring any title documents, and no
facts in the complaint support a claim that SunTrust "breached the
contract or exceeded the bounds of reasonableness by failing to perform
these tasks."314 Additionally, the court held SunTrust should not have

308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.

Id.
78 F. Supp. 2d 1366 (1999).
Id. at 1368-71.
Id. at 1368.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1368-69.
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been required to look beyond the contract because URC 522 specifically
"instructs collecting banks to act only upon the instructions given by the
remitting bank," and the comments to URC 522 warn banks they should
"not look elsewhere for instructions."3 15 Article 8 of the URC 522
further provides:
Where the remitting bank instructs that either the collecting bank or
drawee is to create documents (bills of exchange, promissory notes,
trust receipts, letters of undertaking or other documents) that were not
included in the collection, the form and wording of such documents
shall be provided by the remitting bank, [sic] otherwise the collecting
bank shall not be liable or responsible for the form and wording of any
such document provided by the collecting bank and/or the drawee.31
SunTrust had no liability under Article 8 because Banco in fact had not
provided specific wording for the trust receipts to be collected. 3 "
SunTrust also was "'otherwise instructed' to release the title documents
before receiving full or even partial payment." 8
Furthermore,
SunTrust's failure to notify Banco of Collins Brokerage's failure to pay
the remittances in full did not impose liability on SunTrust. Collins
Brokerage honored the documentary drafts by executing the trust
receipts and commitment letters, accepting the title documents from
SunTrust, and accepting the peanut shipments. Therefore, SunTrust did
not violate the contract, which did not describe when honor or dishonor
occurred. 1 9 Although Collins Brokerage's failure to pay under the
trust receipts may have constituted a default, the default did not
"amount to dishonor of the documentary drafts."32 °
C.

Title V of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act

"
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act,32
' which is commonly referred to as
the Financial Services Modernization Act ("FSMA" or "the Act") was
enacted on November 12, 1999, and all rules will technically take effect
on November 12, 2000. Because of the significant burden that the Act
places on financial institutions, a period of voluntary compliance has
been established and will be in effect from November 12, 2000 until July

315. Id. at 1369; see also ICC Uniform Rules for Collection: A Commentary of 13
(1995).
316. 78 F. Supp. at 1369.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id. at 1369-70.
320. Id. at 1370.
321. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999), Pub. L.
No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999).
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1, 2001.322 Essentially, the Act provides sweeping changes to the
Glass-Stegall Act of 1933323 and outlines privacy policy standards that
will govern the use of consumer information that is collected by financial
institutions. The Act covers a wide range of financial institutions and
dictates that these financial institutions must protect and safeguard
customer information and records. At its core, the privacy policy
standards require a financial institution to provide notice of the privacy
policy to its consumer customers .and to provide .pt-out notice before
sharing any consumer information with third parties.324 Additionally,
any company receiving nonpublic personal information is automatically
subjected to limitation on re-use of that information.325
Financial institutions are defined to include all entities in banking,
lending, financial or investment advisory; mutual fund, securities,
insurance, or trust services; as well as activities simply deemed
"financial in nature" or incidental to a financial activity.3 26 The Act is

intended to cover all "personally identifiable financial information" and
information other than "publicly available information."3 27 The Act is
broadly drafted to include that all information received in connection
with a financial transaction including personal information that is not
intrinsically financial. Financial institutions must provide annual notice
of the privacy policies, which must be clear, and conspicuous and inform
customers (1) of the categories of information collected and disclosed, (2)
the sources of such information, (3) the usage of the information, and (4)
to whom the information is disclosed or may be disclosed in the
future. 32' Although the restrictions are broad and wide within the Act,
leeway is provided to the financial institutions regarding use of the
protected information. As an example, financial institutions may release
the account numbers of current customers
to that same financial
329
institution's own credit card company.
As with every other financial institution covered by the Act, Georgia
banks will need to wade through the massive revisions in the Act and
prepare for the modernization of the financial services industry.

322.
323.
324.

See 12 C.F.R. § 40.18 (2000).
Tit. V(A) § 501.
Id. § 502.

325.
326.
327.
328.
329.

Id.
Id. § 503.
Id. § 508.
Id. § 503.
Id. § 502.
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D. Legislative Changes
The 1999 session of the General Assembly of Georgia passed several
amendments to the Code as it relates to financial institutions.3 3 ° The
most notable are summarized below.
1. Modification to Specific Limitations on Financial Institution
Operations or Powers. To highlight discretion permitted by the
Code, and to provide parity with other federally insured financial
institutions, the Commissioner may modify or amend qualifying or
limiting requirements imposed on financial institutions including:
collateral requirements and limits on the amounts of obligations owing
to it from any one person or corporation, loan to value or other limitations in real estate lending, limitations on the amount of investments
and stock or other capital securities of a corporation or other entity, and
limitations on the amount of bank acceptances to be issued.331 Before
any order ratifying or amending limitations is issued, the Commissioner
must determine "that such activity will not present undue safety and
332
soundness risks to the financial institution or institutions involved."
2. Ownership of Certain Public Property. O.C.G.A. section 7-1282333 was further amended to include specific reference to permit a
bank to own or lease certain public real property and facilities. The
amended Code section specifically references purchase of or construction
of a municipal building, school building, or other similar state, local, or
other governmental authority facility if, as holder of legal title, the
purchases for the purposes of leasing the facility to a municipality or
other public or governmental authority that has the authority to enter
into the lease and the resources sufficient to make lease payments as
they come due, is authorized to levy taxes or is backed by the taxing
authority of another political subdivision.334
3. Acquisition of Out-of-State Banking Institutions. O.C.G.A.
section 7-1-288(C) 335 was revised to remove the limitation providing
that a bank could only acquire and hold for its own accounts banking
institutions that were located primarily within Georgia. As revised, the

330. O.C.G.A. §§ 7-1-1 to -8 (1997 & Supp. 2000).
331. Id. § 7-1-61.

332. Id.
333.
334.
335.

Id. § 7-1-282(2).
Id.
Id. § 7-1-288(c)(2)(E)(ii).
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statute now only limits a bank's ownership to consist primarily of
depository financial institutions.336
4. Bank's Board of Directors. O.C.G.A. section 7-1-480,337 which
outlines the requirements for the board of directors of a bank or trust
company, was amended to provide a carve-out in the situation involving
a bank that has branches in states other than Georgia. Whereas the
prior language required each director to live within forty miles of any
bank office located in Georgia, the new language requires that "the
residency of directors [be] consistent with the bank's articles of
incorporation and bylaws."3 38 Additionally, banks may now establish
"non policy-making regional boards of directors" that will operate and
exercise certain powers, duties and responsibilities delegated to it by the
board.339
5. Bank Branch Offices. The various provisions for the establishment of bank branch offices were amended to include a new listing of
factors that the department will use in its consideration of the application for establishing any new branch office. 4 ° The revised language
in O.C.G.A. sections 7-1-628.7(e) and (0341 provides for heightened
cooperation, regulation, supervision and reporting by branches established in interstate banking and branching by merger.
7. Mortgage Brokers and Mortgage Lenders. The revisions to
Chapter 1 of Title VII also included a substantial revision of the code
sections regarding mortgage brokers and mortgage lenders to impose
new licensing, educational, and other requirements.342
VI.

PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS: LEGISLATIVE CHANGES

The 1999 session of the General Assembly of Georgia passed several
amendments to Title 43-The Professions and Businesses title of the
Code. The most notable are summarized below.

336. Id.
337.

Id. § 7-1-480.

338. Id.
339. Id. § 7-1-482(d).
340. Id. § 7-1-602(a)(2).

341. Id. § 7-1-628.7(e) and (f).
342.

Id. § 7-1-1000 to -1018.
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Athlete Agents

A.

The revisions amended provisions affecting the regulation of athlete
agents, provided additional grounds for refusing to register or discipline
an athlete agent, amended the provisions relating to notice of the
signing of an agent contract that is given to an institution of higher
education and to the Georgia Athlete Agent Regulatory Commission,
provided for certain terms to be included in agent contracts, and
authorized an institution of higher education to bring a civil action
against an athlete agent for the recovery of damages.343
ProfessionalLicensing

B.

The revisions to Title 43 also included revisions to the licensing and
regulatory practices of various professions. These professions included
the practice of chiropractic, the regulation of cosmetology, the education
and qualifications for dental hygienist, the licensing requirements of
licensed practical nurses, the licensing to practice acupuncture, the
licensing and registration qualifications of private detectives and
security agencies, and the regulation of athlete agents. 3 "
C.

CharitableSolicitations

The Act also amended the "Georgia Charitable Solicitations Act of
1988"14 1 to change the definition of charitable organization, define
solicitor agent, provide for electronic filing of certain registration forms
by paid solicitors with the Secretary of State, require written consent to
a criminal background investigation, change certain requirements in
financial statements filed by paid solicitors, establish a time limit for the
Secretary of State to register applicants as paid solicitors, require a paid
solicitor to provide a charitable organization detailed records regarding
solicitation campaigns, change the bonding requirements, change
provisions relating to record keeping by registered charitable organizations, and require certain disclosures by paid solicitors to contributors.346

D.

Snow Skiing Safety

Revisions to this Title also included certain requirements with respect
to snow skiing safety. The Act enumerated inherent dangers of skiing

343.
344.
345.
346.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

§§ 43-4A-1 to -19 (1999 & Supp. 2000).
ch. 43.
§§ 43-17-1 to -23.
§§ 43-17-2 to -5, -7 to -9, and -12.
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and provided for the assumption of risk and responsibilities and duties
as passengers on tramways.34 7 It required the posting of signs designating trails and slopes by degree of difficulty, posting of a warning
notice relating to the inherent dangers of skiing, addition of snow
grooming equipment and snowmobiles, and it provided for the revocation
of skiing privileges of persons in violation of the Act.34

347.
348.

Id. ch. 43-43A.
Id.

